We consider an environment where individuals sequentially choose among several actions. The payoff to an individual depends on her action choice, the state of the world, and an idiosyncratic, privately observed preference shock. Under weak conditions, as the number of individuals increases, the sequence of choices always reveals the state of the world. This contrasts with the familiar result for pure common-value environments where the state is never learned, resulting in herds or informational cascades. The medium run dynamics to convergence can be very complex and non-monotone: posterior beliefs may be concentrated on a wrong state for a long time, shifting suddenly to the correct state.
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Introduction
Consider a traveller deciding at which of many restaurants to dine in Barcelona. Reliable rumor has it that a famous guitarist will perform after dinner at one restaurant for the exclusive benefit of the diners. The traveller has gathered some useful information about where the guitarist will likely perform, but this information is inconclusive. Before deciding, however, the traveller is able to observe the dining choices of others who have acquired possibly different information regarding the performance location, and have also observed previous diners' choices.
How should the traveller decide, and how likely are restaurant goers to learn where the guitarist will perform?
Following Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) , the standard analysis of this situation assumes all restaurants are identical so that the only payoff relevant difference between restaurants is whether the guitarist will be there. In this case, the public information revealed by the choices of the first several individuals dominates the private information of subsequent decision-makers. Once this occurs, later choices are made independently of privately held information, creating an informational cascade. In a cascade, beliefs about the performance location become "stuck" since decisions do not reveal any privately held information. Furthermore, once a cascade starts, since individuals share identical preferences, they will all choose the restaurant indicated by the first few decisions, a phenomenon known as a herd. Since beliefs in a cascade are based on the imperfect information of a few initial decision-makers, restaurant goers never learn the true location and with positive probability they will all make the wrong choice. Cascades will occur despite the wealth of information in the economy, which, if aggregated, would almost surely reveal the location.
1
In this paper we show that this negative conclusion is not robust to relaxing the assumption that all restaurants are identical. Stated differently, restaurants are assumed to be homogeneous goods so that dining choices are driven entirely by a commonly-valued "vertical" or quality component, i.e. the performer. In reality, however, restaurants are also "horizontally" differentiated with some specializing in Catalan cuisine, others in Spanish, French, tapas, seafood, etc.
In this more realistic setting, individuals' choices may also (partly) reflect their idiosyncratic tastes and common beliefs do not necessarily translate into identical decisions.
2
It is difficult (if not impossible) to think of any decision-making environment where everyone's preferences are perfectly aligned and only a single common-value element plays a role.
3
We show that information will almost surely be revealed if there are sufficiently diverse idiosyncratic tastes. At first glance this result is paradoxical. The direct effect of introducing idiosyncratic tastes is to dilute the information content of observed actions, which would seem to hinder information aggregation. As we demonstrate, however, it is precisely this dilution of inferences from observations that allows observational learning to continue to the limit, rather than becoming stuck. In our example, if consumers have heterogeneous tastes over restaurants, the guitarist's location becomes publicly known with arbitrarily high probability as the number of observed dining choices grows. No matter how strong the evidence becomes that the guitarist will be at a particular restaurant, there may still be individuals who choose a different restaurant. Because of this possibility, there is something to be learned from every decision. We provide a general set of conditions on payoff functions and on the information structure such that complete learning is achieved in the limit. Moreover, due to the idiosyncratic taste differences built into our model, different actions may be selected even when beliefs have (almost) converged. This contrasts sharply with the existing literature where the emphasis has been mostly on information cascades and herding.
Other authors have obtained positive convergence results under different assumptions. Lee (1993) provides conditions under which full learning must occur in a pure common-value model.
His result relies on a sufficiently rich action space, so that actions can perfectly reveal signals. Smith and Sorensen (2000) show that full learning occurs when private signals and beliefs are "unbounded," i.e. when some signals are fully (or arbitrarily close to fully) revealing of the state.
4
Smith and Sorensen (2000) also admit the possibility of heterogeneous tastes, but in a different manner than the present paper. They assume that preferences differ only along the vertical dimension of common values.
5,
In the context of the above example, this means that all restaurants are identical, except some diners like to hear guitar music, while others prefer to avoid it. Smith and Sorensen (2000) show that in such environments the process of social learning may stop due to "confounded learning." The idea is that choices are sensitive to privately held information, but others cannot extract any information them because they cannot distinguish whether the choices were due to signals or preferences.
The main difference between our setup and that of Smith and Sorensen (2000) In contrast, our approach integrates the private-value (ideology) and common-value (competence) elements in a way that includes both vertical and horizontal 4 There is also a more distantly related literature on Bayesian learning in games. The paper in this literature closest to ours is Jackson and Kalai (1997) , who identify sufficient conditions under which agents in a population are able to infer the true distribution over player types by observing a history of stage game strategies. Our environment does not satisfy the conditions for their results.
5 A second restriction that Smith and Sorensen (2000) impose in the latter case is that the set of possible voters' ideal points is finite. We address this later in the paper.
6 Confounded learning may occur in case (i) because votes for a particular candidate may be have been cast by voters who value (in)competence, and in case (ii) because votes may have been cast by leftists who believe the candidate's ideology is left, or rightist voters who believe the opposite. differentiation in preferences. For this example, voters' private values would be determined by how close their ideal points are to the candidates' known ideology, as in standard voting models. In addition, voters receive imperfect information about the common value component, competence. Ceteris paribus, all voter prefer a more competent candidate, but some voters may vote for the less competent candidate for ideological reasons.
This approach permits a tractable analysis when there is an arbitrary number of states, actions, and signals. We thus extend the previous literature, which has focused mainly on the case of two states. The inclusion of multiple states allows a deeper understanding of the dynamics of the underlying stochastic belief process. Convergence of beliefs may seem to imply trivial or monotonic dynamics. Indeed, we show that, on average, the weight public beliefs assign to the true state rises. Yet it is not the case that any specific trajectory of beliefs will necessarily follow a monotone dynamic. We construct examples where beliefs are likely to first drift toward an incorrect state and then suddenly shift to converge upon the true state.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. The evolution of public beliefs and optimal choice behavior are characterized in Section 3 and Section 4 respectively. Section 5 develops the main convergence result. Section 6 contains a more detailed analysis of the dynamic processes of beliefs and actions. In section 7 we connect our results to the previous literature and discuss generalizations. Section 8 concludes. Most proofs are sketched in the body of the paper, with complete proofs given in an Appendix.
The Model
There is a countable set T = {1, 2, · · ·} of agents who choose, in sequence, one of several actions. For each t ∈ T , let a The assumption that signals are bounded is not needed for our convergence results but is made to rule out trivial cases where some signals are fully revealing. 
Payoffs
Individual payoffs have two components, a private-value component and a common-value component. The latter depends on the action taken by the agent and the state of the world. If agent t's action is a and the state of the world is k, the common-value component is given by Π ak , where Π is the common-value payoff matrix. Without loss of generality we choose units such that 0 < Π ak < 1 for all a ∈ A and k ∈ K. Furthermore, we say that Π is admissible if
Assumption 2. Π is admissible with elements strictly between 0 and 1.
Note that admissibility requires that the gain (or loss) from switching from action a to a varies across states. In particular, all columns of Π have to be distinct, i.e. states are (common-value) payoff-distinguishable. Admissibility holds generically only when there are at least as many actions as states; we explore the implications of relaxing Assumption 2 in Section 7.2.
Private-value components are assigned by nature as iid draws from a commonly known distribution of action-specific payoff disturbances. We assume the distribution of private values has a joint density, denoted by f (v , the probabilities with which each action is chosen.
Public and Private Beliefs
From the definition of payoffs, it is clear that agent t cares about the history only to the extent that it is informative about the state of the world. Let P t k ≡ Prob(k|h t ) denote the public belief that the state is k given the history of choices h
public beliefs in period 1 coincide with prior beliefs:
The analysis below is greatly simplified by the observation that, for any given strategy profile, public beliefs in period t + 1 are completely determined by agent t's choice and public beliefs in period t. In other words, the public belief P t k serves as a sufficient statistic for the history of choices, h t .
After observing her private signal s t , agent t updates her private belief that the state is k
4. Optimal Choice Behavior: Cutpoints Agent t's optimal action is a if it yields the highest expected payoff, i.e. if for all a = a
To derive agent t's choice probabilities, we define for each signal s t and each pair of actions, given by:
for each a ∈ A. We first establish that, under Assumptions 2 and 3, all actions have a positive chance of being selected. Proof. See Appendix.
Convergence
Here we investigate the evolution of agents' beliefs and corresponding choices. We define
are the probabilities of observing action a when the state is k, given the history h t . Note that 
We next establish that no alternative is ruled out in finite time.
Proof. See Appendix.
Since all actions have a strictly positive chance of being chosen (Lemma 1), if, for some t,
If this happens, then we say the process of learning stops at time t.
Definition 4. Learning stops at t if and only if
P t+1 k (a) = P t k , for all k ∈ K, a ∈ A. Since P t k > 0
by Lemma 2, equation (5.2) implies that learning stops if and only if
which in turn holds if and only if: 
The S-dimensional vector e = (1, 1, · · · , 1) is a null (left) eigenvector of the matrix Q 1 = q sk −q s1 , with k = 1 and s = 1, · · · , S. Assumption 1 implies that Q 1 has rank at least S − 1, so e is the unique null eigenvector. Hence Proof. Here we illustrate the proof for the specific case A = K = 3 and S = 2. The proof for the general case can be found in the Appendix.
(Only if) Suppose, in contradiction, cutpoints are not independent of signals: 
or, equivalently,
for all k ∈ K and s ∈ S. Using (3.1) this can be written
Let Ω ⊆ K denote the set of states for which the public belief is strictly positive, i.e. P t k > 0 for all k ∈ Ω. From (5.4) we conclude that q sk is the same for all s ∈ S and all k ∈ Ω, which violates the informative-signal assumption unless Ω contains only a single element.
(If) Suppose public beliefs are degenerate, then private beliefs, and hence cutpoints, are independent of signals.
Q.E.D.
Theorem 1. Learning stops if and only if public beliefs are degenerate.
Proof. Immediate from Lemmas 3 through 5.
Q.E.D.
We next show that the learning process in fact converges, and that, in the limit, the public beliefs put all mass on the true state k. In what follows we assume, without loss of generality, that the true state is k = 1. We define the (public) likelihood ratio against the true state
Lemma 6. The likelihood ratio t 1 defines a martingale process conditional on state 1.
Proof. Define t 1 (a) = −1 + 1/P t 1 (a) for a ∈ A. Conditional on k = 1, the transition probabilities are given by
(5.5) Using (5.2) condition (5.5) can be worked out as also converges almost surely to a limit random variable. We are now in position to state our main result. 
is finite, which implies that public beliefs cannot converge to an incorrect state. By Lemmas 3 to 5, public beliefs also cannot converge to a non-degenerate distribution over states, so they must converge to the true state with probability one.
Dynamics
The martingale property of the conditional likelihood ratio against the true state implies that the belief for the true state obeys a sub-martingale. In other words, the expected change in beliefs for the true state is always non-negative.
Lemma 7. The public belief P t 1 defines a sub-martingale process conditional on state 1.
for all a ∈ A, the public belief is a strictly convex transformation of the likelihood ratio against the true state. Hence
applying Jensen's inequality and Lemma 6 in the last line.
Q.E.D.
Thus the public beliefs converge to the true state almost surely (Theorem 2) and they always increase in expectation. Together these results may seem to suggest that the belief process tends to follow a monotone dynamic, converging smoothly to the correct beliefs from any nondegenerate prior. However, this is generally not the case. That is, there is a wide range of possible paths that beliefs may follow, many of which are non-monotonic and exhibit sudden jumps.
To illustrate this point, consider the following example where A = S = K = 2. We can define the signal technology and private value distributions such that, with high probability, beliefs initially tend towards the incorrect state. Specifically, the information structure is given by P 4) . In this case, 66% of all individuals choose action 2 even when they believe the true state is 1. In other words, no matter how strong the evidence for state 1, a majority of agents will nevertheless choose action 2 for idiosyncratic reasons.
An important feature of the dynamics in this example is that the change in posterior beliefs after observing either choice is highly asymmetric. Specifically, after observing a choice for 2, 
(right panel). The few choices for alternative 1, however, are sufficient to eventually tilt beliefs to the correct alternative (left panel).
the evidence for 2 is only slightly stronger, since successors rationally realize that the decision was likely driven by private value considerations, and not by information regarding the common value. Thus even after observing many choices for 2, the effective sample of "2 signals" inferred from the history is comparatively small. In contrast, after a choice for 1 is observed, the evidence for 1 increases substantially since agents know that it is unlikely that the choice was based on idiosyncratic tastes; instead, it is very likely that s t = 1. This situation is illustrated in Figure 1 , which presents a simulation of ten trials of 250 periods each using the above specifications. The belief for state 1 is plotted in the left panel and the corresponding cumulative choice frequencies for alternative 1 in the right panel. Note that many of the belief paths are non-monotonic and exhibit sudden shifts to the correct state following a choice for alternative 1. This example demonstrates that individuals are capable of learning the true state even when few of them actually choose it, as can be seen in the right hand panel of Figure 1 , where the cumulative frequencies for alternative 1 are all less than 34%.
When we consider more general settings, where there are several states and alternatives, it is in fact not necessary that some individuals choose the superior alternative in order for learning to converge to the correct beliefs. Consider the following situation where A = S = K = 3. As The common value payoff matrix is again given by the identity matrix: Π = I, so that actions correspond directly to states. Private values are drawn independently across alternatives with
where µ 1 = 2, µ 2 = µ 3 = 0, and the scale parameter is λ = 5.
Thus the distribution of private values for the true state 1 is shifted down by 2 units and with a high value of λ it is very unlikely that individuals ever choose action 1. Instead there will be only choices for alternatives 2 and 3. However, from the frequencies of these choices, individuals learn the relative frequencies with which signals for alternatives 2 and 3 are received. Since these relative frequencies differ across all three states, individuals still are able to learn that the true state is 1. Figure 2 depicts a simulation of public beliefs (left panel) along with a moving average of corresponding choice frequencies (right panel) for 500 periods, where green denotes the true state 1, blue denotes 2, and red corresponds to 3. Prior beliefs put mass 90% on state 3, with the remaining 10% split equally between states 1 and 2. The right panel shows that the first 100 choices or so are for 3, so that beliefs for state 3 increase from the initial prior. But once some individuals draw high private valuations for alternative 2, they break the herd and beliefs shift very quickly to state 2. However, the continuing presence of choices for alternative 3 causes beliefs to eventually converge upon state 1, even though no single 1-choice is made.
Note that after beliefs have (almost) converged, choice frequencies are approximately 50% for alternatives 2 and 3, since conditional on state 1, the common value payoff from each of these alternatives are the same (zero) and the private values are identically distributed . Thus while beliefs converge upon the true state, a herd never arises.
Extensions
In this section we explore the consequences of relaxing some key assumptions of the model presented in Section 2. We first discuss how the iid assumption of private valuations can be relaxed. We also show why the assumption of full support is essential for complete learning.
Second we turn to the common-value payoffs, and show through an example the role of admissibility. We sketch a proof that complete learning still holds generically when the admissibility condition is not met.
Private Valuations
We first discuss two ways in which one can relax the assumptions on how agents receive their private values for the various alternatives in A.
Private Values: Full Support
Recall the full support Assumption 3, which requires the support of private values for each alternative to contain the unit interval. In order to connect our results to previous findings, we shall be mainly interested in the alternative case of a finite number of private values, which of course violates the full support condition. Our main finding is that without full support, beliefs fail to converge upon the true state. However, even in the absence of complete learning, it is never possible for inferences to cause beliefs to converge to an incorrect state (see Smith and Sorensen, 2000) .
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Lemma 8. For any distribution F (·), if P 0 1 > 0, then beliefs a.s. cannot converge to an incorrect state.
We next discuss two examples of private-value distributions for which "pathological outcomes" arise, i.e. for which learning is incomplete. First, consider the case where the distribution of private values has a single mass point at v t = (0, . . . , 0), so that choices are driven purely by the common-value component. This case generalizes the basic model discussed in Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) .
11
With bounded signals there always exist choice histories where the resulting public beliefs are strong enough to outweigh any private information, creating an informational cascade. The set of beliefs at which a cascade occurs, i.e. the cascade set, is a connected set containing the boundaries of the beliefs simplex, and has open interior.
12
An example for the case of two states is given in the left panel of Figure 3 13 where the expected change in public beliefs is shown for all possible values of the public belief. For the case of two states it can be shown that learning stops (i.e. condition (5.3)) if and only if the expected change in beliefs is zero, and whenever beliefs are not in a cascade set the expected change to the true state is strictly positive. As t becomes large, public beliefs eventually enter one of the 10 This result is again a direct consequence of the martingale property of the likelihood ratio (since it holds for any distribution of values) and Fatou's Lemma, since if beliefs were to converge upon an incorrect state, the likelihood ratio against the true state would explode. Note that even in such cases, however, beliefs must still converge by the Martingale Convergence Theorem, and since it is not possible for beliefs to converge upon any incorrect state, beliefs must settle upon some non-degenerate point that places mass on multiple states.
11 We allow for asymmetries in the signal technology and common value payoffs which BHW do not explicitly consider.
12 We follow Smith and Sorensen (2000) in using this term. 
for the case of two possible states and no private values (upper left panel), a finite number of private values (upper right), continuous private values with full support (lower left), and continuous values without full support (lower right).
cascade sets with probability one, after which learning stops.
Next consider the case of multiple mass points in the unit square. As in the case of a single mass point, the probability of eventually reaching an interior belief at which a cascade occurs is one. The principle difference arising from introducing more private values to the support is that the cascade set has more regions. In general, with finite support, the cascade set will consist of the union of a finite collection of separated regions (see the upper right panel of Figure 3 ).
Which region beliefs eventually settle into depends on prior beliefs and the specific history of signals and choices.
The intuition behind the failure of complete learning in the above examples may be generalized in a straightforward manner.
Lemma 9. Beliefs a.s. cannot converge to the correct state if F (·) has finite support.
To understand this result note that when the support of F (·) is finite, its graph will be a step function with "flat" regions almost everywhere. The expression for the choice probabilities in (4.2) reduces to a finite sum, which is invariant with respect to small variations in the cutpoints ] and the common-value payoff matrix is the identity.
Private Values: IID across Agents
We have assumed that private values are distributed according to a joint distribution f (·) that is independent and identically distributed across agents. Thus while we allowed for correlation across alternatives, we prohibited any correlation in private values across agents. This is in fact not necessary for our results. All of the results still hold if we allow private values to have agent-
Relaxing independence of private values across agents presents a more complex argument, but we believe our results are also robust to this change. Suppose there was some positive correlation in private values across agents. Then after observing an action a t all agents revise their beliefs in such a way that they believe the subsequent agent is more likely to have a high value of v t+1 a . So if agent t + 1 chooses a also, then beliefs on the state are updated less than in the case of independence. This illustrates that correlation may affect the rate of convergence, but should not change the limit results.
Common Value Payoffs: Admissibility
Recall the definition of admissibility required by Assumption 2. Without this assumption, our results hold generically, but not universally. To see this, first note that admissibility implies A≥K. Consider the following example where A = S = 2 and K = 3, so admissibility is violated. , and for s = 2, equals 1( ) such that learning will continue. Indeed, the set of beliefs from which learning continues to the limit is open and dense (and full Lebesgue measure) in the belief simplex. This is illustrated for the example in Figure 4 , which displays the simplex of beliefs over the three states. The upper vertex corresponds to beliefs concentrated on state 1, the lower left ).
14 More generally, for any common value matrix Π with distinct columns and any nonredundant signal distribution matrix Q, the set of beliefs at which learning stops is at most a lower-dimensional subset of the K-simplex. The same is true for the "pre-image" of such a public belief vector P t under the belief updating process. Working backwards from t to initial beliefs P 0 in an inductive fashion, the set of initial beliefs that could potentially lead to beliefs P t in finite time is a countable union of sets of measure zero, and so is itself a set of measure zero.
Thus quite generally the set of prior beliefs P 0 from which learning could stop at a nondegenerate outcome has measure zero, and our convergence result in Theorem 2 holds generically in this sense. When admissibility is satisfied, however, we get the stronger universal convergence result, where all priors necessarily lead to fully correct learning in the limit. Furthermore, in the 14 The upper vertex is also an absorbing belief and is marked as a separate point.
case A ≥ K, Π satisfies the admissibility condition generically, so that almost all common-value technologies are admissible. 
16
In all three extensions, full learning still obtains. Errors in belief updating are modelled as in Kahnemann and Tversky (1973) , which presented experimental evidence that some individuals will overweight their private signal relative to the prior, a judgement bias that has become known as the base rate fallacy. All of the information aggregation results of the previous sections continue to hold even in the presence of this fallacies (or the opposite, under-weighting). Of additional interest is the fact that the learning process is actually faster as agents' behavior reflects the base rate fallacy. The second type of irrational behavior we consider is that agents sometimes "tremble" and accidentally choose the wrong alternative with some probability (which may vary over time). Alternatively, one could suppose there is imperfect monitoring, and agents' choices are observed with error. This addition to the model does not change the results. The third type of irrational behavior is 15 The constant could of course be zero, in which case these columns of Π would be identical.
16 See Goeree, Palfrey, and Rogers (2003) for details.
that these trembles are payoff related. That is, agents are better at avoiding high cost errors than low cost errors. This is the basic idea behind quantal response equilibrium Palfrey, 1995, 1998 Proof of Lemma 2. The proof is by induction. Recall that Finally the reverse implication is clear from (4.2).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2. Lemma 6 shows that t 1 is a martingale. By the Martingale Convergence Theorem (see Doob, 1953) , there exists a limit random variable to which t 1 converges almost surely. Since , contradicting the assumption that it is a limit point with positive probability.
Lemmas 2 through 4 establish that the only possible such fixed points occur where beliefs are degenerate. Thus with probability one, t 1 → 0, i.e., beliefs converge to the correct state almost surely.
